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Chairperson: David Sherman
  Friedrich Nietzsche presents clear attacks on deontological and utilitarian branches of ethical the-
ory. His thoughts on virtue ethics, however, are less clear. Some ethicists argue that Nietzsche’s ethi-
cal project is essentially virtue ethical, while others argue that Nietzsche fails to put forth an accept-
able ethics. Sympathetic virtue ethicists typically focus on Nietzsche’s virtues of individual character, 
whereas critics often highlight potential problems between the Nietzschean virtuous agent and his or 
her society. This thesis seeks to respond to the concerns of the latter group, in order to help make 
room for reading Nietzsche’s ethical discussions in a more positive light. I pursue this line of 
thought by way of detailed responses to two prominent critics of Nietzsche’s ethics, Alasdair MacIn-
tyre and Philippa Foot. Chapter one responds to MacIntyre’s claim that Nietzsche’s ethical project is 
a creation of values ex nihilo, without respect to tradition or community, and is therefore relativistic. 
I argue that this is not the case, and show that Nietzsche’s ethics is perhaps more capable of re-
sponding to the problems MacIntyre sees in modernity than MacIntyre allows. In chapter two I re-
spond to Foot’s claim that Nietzsche’s ethics fails because it cannot categorically proscribe even the 
most egregious acts. In my view, even though Nietzsche rejects the notion of categorical proscrip-
tions, he has a response to Foot’s concern.
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Introduction:
Society and Nietzschean Ethics
Nietzsche presents clear attacks on deontological and utilitarian branches of ethical theory.* In re-
gards to virtue ethics, on the other hand, Nietzsche’s position is less transparent. While many agree 
that there is room to read Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist, there is less agreement as to whether or not 
Nietzsche’s ethics is ultimately feasible or desirable. Some ethicists, such as Robert Solomon, Chris-
tine Swanton, and Michael Slote, argue that Nietzsche’s project is essentially a virtue ethical project. 
While each thinker emphasizes different aspects of Nietzsche’s work, they all think Nietzschean eth-
ics makes a valuable contribution to modern ethical theory. Critics such as Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Philippa Foot also read Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. However, they argue that Nietzsche, while 
concerned with moral issues, fails to put forth an acceptable ethics.
 Sympathetic virtue-ethical readings of Nietzsche point out his focus on virtues of individual 
human excellence, and note that his particular take on excellence highlights virtuous character traits 
seldom considered in the canon of modern virtues. Solomon argues that these virtues can be read as 
1
* All citations of Nietzsche appear in-text as an abbreviation, with appropriate section and sub-section numbers follow-
ing. The abbreviations refer to the english translations listed below. All italics in quotations are original unless otherwise 
noted. Citations of  all other works will appear as footnotes.
D: Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
HAH: Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, trans. Marion Faber (Lincoln: University of  Nebraska Press, 1986).
GS: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
GM: Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hack-
ett Publishing Company, Inc., 1998).
BGE: Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil, in Walter Kaufman, trans., Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New  York: Modern 
Library, 2000) 179-435.
T: Friedrich Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols, in Walter Kaufman, trans., The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Penguin 
Inc., 1982) 463-563.
EH: Friedrich Nietzsche Ecce Homo, in Walter Kaufman, trans., Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New  York: Modern Library, 
2000) 673-791.
a modernist revival of Aristotelean concerns,1  whereas Slote argues that Nietzsche’s conception of 
excellence reflects a type of virtue ethics that differs completely from the standard Aristotelean 
model.2 Meanwhile, virtue ethicists who criticize Nietzsche focus on his supposed rejection of mo-
rality and the problematic implications of his individualism. In their view, these two strains in Nietz-
sche’s thought imply that the superior individual is all-important and the individual’s society is either 
a mere instrument toward his or her ends, or else is simply beside the point.3 Given that virtue ethics 
is not only a study of character traits but also of how those traits inform an agent’s actions in the 
(social) world, this is a serious challenge that deserves a response from those interested in reading 
Nietzsche sympathetically.
 This thesis seeks to articulate the relationship between the Nietzschean superior individual 
and his or her society from the viewpoint of a sympathetic reading. I pursue this line of thought by 
responding to two critics who attack this social dimension of Nietzsche’s thought, Alasdair MacIn-
tyre and Philippa Foot. 
 In Chapter 1, I respond to MacIntyre’s claim that Nietzsche’s project of value creation is a 
creation ex nihilo, and therefore presents a grounding problem for shared ethical commitments. Mac-
Intyre’s claim is closely tied to his critique of modern morality as ungrounded and emotivist. In 
MacIntyre’s view, Nietzsche’s ethics and moral critique are the culmination of the Enlightenment 
breakdown which underlies the problem of emotivism in modern morality. I argue that, while Nietz-
sche’s moral critique is parallel to MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, there are important areas of 
divergence. Where MacIntyre sees modern morality as paralyzed by a plurality of values, Nietzsche 
2
1 Robert C. Solomon, Living With Nietzscshe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) especially pages 137-174.
2  Michael Slote, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.” In Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 239-262.
3  In this thesis, I  use the term ‘superior individual’ to designate the ideal virtuous agent in Nietzsche’s work. Nietzsche 
uses many terms throughout his corpus to refer to the ideal person such as the “sovereign individual” and the “free 
spirit.” To circumvent this variety of terminology, I use the superior individual to signify Nietzsche’s ideal virtuous agent. 
However, this term explicitly excludes the concept of the noble, which I argue identifies a group of individuals in his-
tory, rather than an ideal type. Where the term noble refers to particular individuals of the past, the superior individual is 
the ideal for today, or for the near future. Section 3 of  each chapter elaborates on this distinction.
takes pluralism to be a fact (albeit an unfortunate one), and attempts to grapple with it. I argue that 
this does not result in a project of value creation ex nihilo, but instead in the uncovering of latent 
values which are immanent in modernity, though perhaps unthematized as values. Nietzsche can 
propose such a project in a way MacIntyre cannot because of his view that, while the social cohesion 
of ancient societies was centrally important to those societies, it is not a realistic possibility for mod-
ern society; and thus romanticizing premodern ways of  life is nihilistic.
 Chapter 2 responds to the criticism of Philippa Foot. Foot thinks that Nietzsche’s ethics is 
inimical to justice because the freedoms it grants to superior individuals prevent us from holding 
those individuals to account for their actions. According to Foot, ethics must be able to clearly iden-
tify and universally condemn certain kinds of injustice, and Nietzsche’s individualism cannot accom-
plish this goal. I agree that Nietzsche’s ethics leaves no room for universal proscriptions against cer-
tain types of action. However, I argue that the idea that an ethics must do this is tied to the egalitar-
ian presumptions of Foot’s naturalism rather than the concept of ethics itself. I begin by comparing 
Foot’s naturalist view with Nietzsche’s. This comparison aims to make clear that, while Nietzsche 
rejects the idea that a naturalist ethics is necessarily egalitarian, his naturalism is still capable of pro-
viding a yardstick of sorts, just as Foot’s does. I then critique Foot’s understanding of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism, which plays a central role both in Nietzschean ethics and her critique of it. Finally, I 
draw on these insights, in order to show that, while Nietzsche will not categorically reject acts that 
we usually take to be unjust, it is a mistake to think that this is tantamount to his sanctioning or mak-
ing allowances for such acts.
 Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of some similarities between these two responses, 
and what those similarities mean for Nietzschean virtue ethics. While I do not attempt to establish 
Nietzschean ethics as anything other than an individualistic ethics of personal excellence, I do aim to 
show that the superior individual’s ethical project does not entail a creation of new values ex nihilo, 
nor does it give the individual license to act in any way they see fit.
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Chapter 1:
MacIntyre, Emotivism, and the Creation of Values
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre declares that Nietzsche’s moral philosophy is “one of two genu-
ine theoretical alternatives confronting anyone trying to analyze the moral condition of our 
culture.”4  According to MacIntyre, the other option—the one he endorses—is to adopt some form 
of Aristotelianism. Robert Solomon takes issue with this dichotomy and argues that, rather than tak-
ing Nietzsche to be an opponent of Aristotelian virtues, we should read him “as a modern-day 
Sophist versus Kant, a defender of the virtues against the categorical imperative.”5  Although Solo-
mon explicates the Nietzschean virtues, he recognizes the fact that Nietzsche—unlike Aristotle—has 
no polis which can provide a context for his virtues.6 Thus, while Solomon shows that MacIntyre’s 
formulation “Nietzsche or Aristotle” is too extreme, this does not mean we have escaped the stark 
choice put forward by MacIntyre. In Solomon’s words, “Without a presupposed ethos, no [moral] jus-
tification is possible. Within an ethos, none is necessary.”7  As MacIntyre sees it, this is precisely why 
we should choose Aristotle over Nietzsche. He argues that Aristotle’s account presupposes a polis 
which can ground our ethics, whereas Nietzsche’s rejects a socially constituted ethics in favor of 
radical individualism. 
 I argue, alongside Solomon, that MacIntyre’s reading of Nietzsche is too simplified. But 
rather than defending the Nietzschean virtues—one aim of Solomon’s—I shall argue that Nietz-
4
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2007), 110.
5 Solomon, Living With Nietzsche, 129.
6 Ibid., 134.
7 Ibid., 128.
sche’s critical project parallels MacIntyre’s own. Both Nietzsche and MacIntyre are concerned with 
how we can rebuild or reconceive ethics given that modern society lacks any coherent ethos for an 
ethics to express. For MacIntyre, this problem is encapsulated in his claim that “Emotivism has be-
come embodied in our culture.”8  In his view, all modern moral discourse is necessarily emotivist. 
Although in different terms, Nietzsche pursues a similar idea by way of his claim that “God is 
dead”(GS §125). As Nietzsche sees it, the steadily diminishing role of the Judeo-Christian tradition 
in modern Europe undermines the assumption that the universal morality of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition is grounded, with the result that the modern individual will increasingly feel free to express 
and pursue personal interests as he or she sees fit. In MacIntyre’s view, Nietzsche sees this as a good 
thing and believes that morality as a whole ought to be cast aside by the superior individual.9
 According to MacIntyre, Nietzsche celebrates modernity’s loss of a telos, as is exemplified in 
The Gay Science section 335. MacIntyre summarizes Nietzsche’s argument in that section as follows:
“In five swift, witty and cogent paragraphs [Nietzsche] disposes of both… the Enlightenment project 
to discover rational foundations for an objective morality and of the confidence of the everyday 
moral agent in post-Enlightenment culture that his moral practice and utterance are in good order.”10
And a few lines later,
“The problem then is how to construct in an entirely original way, how  to invent a new  table of what 
is good and a law, a problem which arises for each individual. This problem would constitute the core 
of  a Nietzschean moral philosophy.”11
MacIntyre later refers to these two summaries as “the Nietzschean diagnosis” and “the Nietzschean 
problematic” respectively.12  According to MacIntyre, Nietzsche recognizes that modern morality 
presupposes a grounding it cannot make good, but his solution is to transition toward an honesty 
5
8 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 22.
9  In fact, Nietzsche is ambivalent about the decline of morality. It is both an opportunity for those who can do better, 
but also problematic, insofar as the sick need morality to keep them in check (cf. GM, III §14 & 27).
10 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 113.
11 Ibid., 114.
12 Ibid., 118.
about the ungrounded nature of morality rather than return to a moral system which would allow 
for moral objectivity.
 MacIntyre and Nietzsche both recognize the significant role highly structured societies (such 
as the Greek polis or medieval Catholic Europe) played in grounding ethical systems in which indi-
viduals could frame life goals and debate values publicly. In the face of the decay of these social 
structures, MacIntyre claims that 
“either one must follow  through the aspirations and the collapse of the different versions of the En-
lightenment project until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the Nietzschean problem-
atic or one must hold that the Enlightenment project was not only mistaken, but should never have 
been commenced in the first place. There is no third alternative.”13
If this really is the choice we must make, between Nietzschean individualism and premodern ethics, 
it is troubling because neither option is desirable or feasible. For his part, MacIntyre sees the Nietz-
schean problematic as undesirable primarily because it offers no standpoint from which we could 
critique the actions and choices of others. In his view, this critical standpoint is only available to in-
dividuals within a society that has a cohesive ethos for their ethics to express. While Nietzsche’s ethics 
is highly individualistic, I claim his view does not reduce to moral relativism. Instead, the differences 
between Nietzsche and MacIntyre’s accounts of the collapse of modern morality allow Nietzsche to 
consider a modern virtue ethical project in a way that MacIntyre cannot.
 Section one of this chapter examines the grounding problem of modern morality by way of 
MacIntyre’s claim that modern morality is emotivist and Nietzsche’s claim that God is dead. I argue 
that, while MacIntyre agrees with the sentiment of Nietzsche’s critique, he does not account for Ni-
etzsche’s concern with the problem of nihilism, which is the primary motivation behind Nietzsche’s 
discussion of the breakdown of morality. Section two takes a closer look at MacIntyre’s understand-
ing of the Nietzschean problematic in terms of a loss of telos. This examination makes clear that, 
despite similarities between MacIntyre’s and Nietzsche’s accounts, MacIntyre’s analysis of modernity 
can present no good response to the problems of pluralism, save a regression to premodern ways of 
6
13 Ibid., 118.
life. Nietzsche, on the other hand, agrees with MacIntyre’s assessment, but moves away from roman-
ticizing the past in order to formulate a genuine ethics within modernity. In section three, I examine 
Nietzsche’s ethical project—the creation of values—and argue that Nietzsche does not intend this 
to be a creation ex nihilo as MacIntyre’s “Nietzschean problematic” implies. I aim to show instead 
that it is an attempt to revive what was admirable and valuable about ancient virtue-ethical society 
within the context of  modernity.
1. The Grounding Problem in Modern Morality
MacIntyre and Nietzsche share a meta-ethical concern over the ability of modern morality to 
ground its principles. In this section, I claim that the problem of emotivism as described by MacIn-
tyre and Nietzsche’s discussion of the shadow of God are both attempts to articulate this grounding 
problem. In this sense, MacIntyre and Nietzsche agree with one another. However, the differences 
in their assessments of  modern morality inform their different solutions.
 MacIntyre describes the modern moral project in the West as essentially emotivist.14 As he 
puts it, “in moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask of expressions 
of personal preference.”15  For MacIntyre, the point is not that the different principles themselves 
are incoherent, but that, while they purport to work toward a rational moral agreement, they cannot 
successfully secure such a result. According to him, our moral arguments are valid (i.e., their conclu-
sions follow from their premises), but because our pluralistic society does not provide a unified 
stock of premises from which we can argue, any moral proof is only convincing to those who share 
our starting assumptions. Therefore, either we are all preaching to the choir, or else we are simply 
cheering on our chosen premises—i.e., emoting.
7
14 Ibid., chapter 2.
15 Ibid., 19.
 Because our moral arguments are valid but do not rule out the arguments of rival views, we 
have no rational way of disproving our rivals’ claims. Instead, each side can only resort to reasser-
tions of their own position ad nauseam. As a result, the differences between moral frameworks are 
incommensurable.16 We cannot move from this fragmented array of starting assumptions to a more 
unified set of premises from within the modern moral project. Thus, as MacIntyre sees it, even 
though an asserted moral principle may rest upon coherent arguments for that principle, in modern 
culture we can only make use of such assertions in order to express our own assumptions—assump-
tions which are not subject to critique by opposing moral viewpoints.
 While Nietzsche’s vocabulary varies considerably from MacIntyre’s, his critique of morality is 
of like kind. Nietzsche also characterizes the modern moral landscape as assuming we can secure 
objective moral agreement when we, in truth, cannot. Nietzsche pursues this idea in The Gay Science, 
when he claims that “God is dead,” but “we still have to vanquish his shadow”(GS §108). This is not 
meant to be a statement of faith, but rather is Nietzsche’s description of a fundamental shift in our 
culture which precipitates a loss of moral objectivity. For at least 1,500 years, God has served as the 
overarching and unifying commitment of European society and culture. However, the Europe in 
which Nietzsche writes had largely renounced faith or simply moved on. Whether it is because new 
social roles place the church at the periphery of one’s life, or because advances in technology and 
science seem to support a new religious skepticism, modern Europe has “killed” God. However, 
Nietzsche points out that the culture at large has not yet come to grips with the fact that to re-
nounce God is not just a statement of belief (or lack thereof), but is a renunciation of all the func-
tions and roles that God previously fulfilled as well. This includes the role God played as the univer-
sal ground for moral claims. In Nietzsche’s time, therefore, morality continued (roughly speaking) 
along the same trajectory, and substantively it was still more or less the morality of the ten com-
mandments. Modernity’s reexamination of faith had not been accompanied by a reexamination of 
8
16 Ibid., 8.
its morality. Where God once served as the reason to be moral, there was now nothing, despite the 
fact that most of Nietzsche’s contemporaries behaved within the moral confines of their society. 
This social practice in the absence of the deity which is its ground is what Nietzsche meant by the 
“shadow of  God.”17 
 While this is certainly not the language of emotivism that MacIntyre employs, given the 
vastly different times in which MacIntyre and Nietzsche are writing, the two accounts still share a 
conclusion: we assume the principles of modern morality are grounded. However, not only are they 
not grounded, but they cannot be grounded within the context of modern moral discourse. We speak 
as if moral principles still had an ultimate grounding, despite the fact that we no longer presuppose 
the God who previously provided that grounding, and in this sense moral discourse takes place in 
the shadow of God.18 According to MacIntyre, modern moral arguments are no longer drawn from 
a unified set of assumptions and they are therefore arbitrary and ungrounded; yet the form of those 
arguments has not changed. Thus, insofar as we are talking only about modern morality as character-
ized by—and suffering from—a false pretense of objectivity, Nietzsche and MacIntyre are largely in 
agreement. However, there is an important difference between their characterizations of modern 
morality.
 For MacIntyre, emotivism represents a breakdown in morality which is at its end stage. 
Things will not degenerate beyond emotivist discourse because any argument for or against cultural 
change presupposes the shared stock of premises which modern pluralism lacks. In a pluralist soci-
ety, there is a question of how many incommensurable moral views are present or allowed. How-
9
17 This idea is addressed again in GS §125, 343.
18 To be clear, Nietzsche describes a period of chaos and war which follows the final collapse of the shadow of God 
(EH, Why I Am a Destiny §1). In many ways, this description reads like a prognostication of the wars of the 20th cen-
tury, which implies that the shadow  of God has been dispelled. However, it is important to separate the geopolitical 
consequences associated with dispelling the shadow  of God from the meta-ethical grounding problem the shadow  pre-
sents. For the sake of clarity, my focus is on the meta-ethical grounding problem, and it is only this that I refer to when I 
say that we are in the shadow of God. Whether we are, geopolitically speaking, still in the shadow  or in the turmoil 
which follows from dispelling it should not affect my argument.
ever, be there two incommensurable moral views or two thousand, the problem MacIntyre sees de-
rives from their incommensurability, not their number.19 This is the context of the choice MacIntyre 
presents between Aristotle and Nietzsche: we can either fight emotivist morality by attempting to 
reunify culture in some way (this would be the Aristotelian choice), or else we can not only embrace 
pluralism but take it to its logical extreme—complete individualism (this is MacIntyre’s idea of the 
Nietzschean choice).
 Nietzsche, on the other hand, does not take the grounding problem in morality to be the end 
of the story. Nietzsche thinks the Europe of his time is still in the shadow of God, but that gradu-
ally people will see that shadow for what it is.20 As more and more people realize that morality is 
groundless, he thinks “morality will gradually perish”(GM, III §27). Here Nietzsche does not mean 
morality as such, but the moral practices of our culture. Nietzsche’s fear is that the death of modern 
morality, which follows from dispelling the shadow of God, is the death of the only thing which has 
kept society together for two millennia. Even though Nietzsche sees the shadow of God as a 
grounding problem similar to the one described by MacIntyre, it is not the problem for Nietzsche. 
Instead, Nietzsche is concerned that, as a result of the collapse of the ascetic ideal, there is nothing 
left standing between us and “suicidal nihilism”(GM, III §28). Nothing, that is, unless we can con-
struct new ideals to direct society.
 It is clear that MacIntyre and Nietzsche have parallel concerns about the grounding of mod-
ern moral thought. However, for Nietzsche, this concern is part of a larger story, which both begins 
earlier than MacIntyre’s concern (with the slave revolt in morality) and ends later (in suicidal nihilism 
or a reorganization of moral practice under new ideals). MacIntyre claims emotivism is the logical 
10
19 One might be inclined to think that a pluralism with two incommensurable moral views is less degenerate than one 
with two thousand, but this would require some objective standpoint for judgment—which, according to MacIntyre, is 
precisely what is lacking in pluralist society.
20 This realization is motivated by the will to truth, which, ironically, Nietzsche sees as a core feature of the ascetic ideal 
that is at the heart of the Judeo-Christian tradition (GM, III §25). This is the sense in which, for Nietzsche, modern mo-
rality is collapsing under its own weight. 
fallout of the Enlightenment project. While Nietzsche and MacIntyre agree that this project col-
lapses as a result of its own principles, only MacIntyre sees the collapse itself as the problem. For 
Nietzsche, the collapse is problematic, but also an opportunity (GM, III §27). The ultimate problem 
we must deal with, he believes, is the question of what will replace the gradually dying morality once 
it is finally dead.
 MacIntyre neither denies nor takes explicit account of this difference, yet he obscures its 
ramifications by placing Nietzsche at the pinnacle of his own historical account of the Enlighten-
ment collapse. While MacIntyre sees the Nietzschean problematic as the logical end of the Enlight-
enment project, I claim Nietzsche’s project is instead an attempt to respond to and go beyond the 
problems both he and MacIntyre find inherent in that project. In the following sections of this 
chapter I argue that, because Nietzsche is looking beyond the grounding problem of modern moral-
ity, MacIntyre’s “Nietzschean problematic” is not actually a fair characterization of  Nietzsche’s view.
2. The Loss of Telos and the Nietzschean Problematic
While examining MacIntyre’s understanding of modern moral problems is not the primary aim of 
this chapter, in this section I want to briefly emphasize the importance MacIntyre places on the con-
cept of a telos. The central role a telos plays in MacIntyre’s conception of ethics is the basis for the 
criticism he levels at Nietzsche. I then examine his understanding of “the Nietzschean problematic.” 
Finally, I point out two problems with the way MacIntyre frames Nietzsche’s moral project.
 According to MacIntyre, a fully functioning ethics has three main parts, which he describes 
as “untutored human nature, man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos and the moral precepts 
which enable him to pass from one state to the other.”21 In other words, the basic function of mo-
rality is to allow a person to move from some natural starting point toward an ideal endpoint. A de-
11
21 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 54—MacIntyre sees the ethical frameworks of both Aristotle and Aquinas as examples of this 
model.
fining characteristic of this model is that “Each of the three elements… requires reference to the 
other two if its status and function are to be intelligible.”22  For example, in this model, human na-
ture is untutored, but the term ‘untutored’ is only meaningful in light of the possibility of moral 
education by way of moral precepts that work towards an ideal “tutored” human nature, which re-
flects some account of the human telos. MacIntyre claims that “the whole point of ethics… is to en-
able man to pass from his present state to his true end.”23 For MacIntyre, a functional virtue ethics 
(such as Aristotle’s) depends on having a clearly understood telos in order to establish its conception 
of the virtuous person. Virtues are only intelligible insofar as their presence within a person is an aid 
to achieving the “good life for man.”24  MacIntyre’s critique of modern morality follows from the 
role teleology plays—must play—in his eyes.
 According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment’s rejection of both Christian theology and Aris-
toteleanism was tantamount to a rejection of the role of the telos  in ethics.25  However, Enlighten-
ment thinkers did not throw out their inherited moral system altogether. Instead, they attempted to 
link the two remaining pieces (human nature and a collection of moral precepts) without the third (a 
human ideal informed by a telos). MacIntyre’s claim is that modernity’s attempt to reinterpret moral-
ity without a telos and without radical changes to the other two parts of the inherited moral scheme 
is incoherent, and therefore destined to fail.26 The modern problem he characterizes as emotivism is 
the direct result of that failure. The loss of a unifying telos towards which our moral principles can 
aim is fundamental to MacIntyre because it effectively removes the grounding which morality needs 
in order for moral precepts to have authority. His accusations of emotivism are in many ways a la-
12
22 Ibid., 53.
23 Ibid., 54.
24 Ibid., 184. Here, MacIntyre argues that Aquinas is able to “synthesize Aristotle and the New  Testament” largely be-
cause Christianity posits a clear conception of  “the good life for man” which can inform the content of  the virtues.
25 Ibid., 54-55.
26 This is the central argument of MacIntyre, After Virtue, chapter 5, “Why the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Mo-
rality Had to Fail.”
ment over the loss of such a unity in modern culture. At one point, MacIntyre even goes so far as to 
say that pluralism “threatens to submerge us all.”27  This criticism of the Enlightenment project is 
essentially the same criticism MacIntyre aims at Nietzsche, whom MacIntyre views as the final em-
bodiment of the inevitable collapse of the Enlightenment moral project.28 The radical individualism 
MacIntyre takes Nietzsche to be promoting is essentially an extreme form of pluralism, in which not 
only do we allow different conceptions of the Good to exist within one culture, but each individual 
subscribes to their own unique conception.
 MacIntyre summarizes his take on Nietzsche’s argument with the two terms I outlined 
briefly in the introduction to this chapter, the “Nietzschean diagnosis” and the “Nietzschean 
problematic.”29  The “Nietzschean diagnosis” is MacIntyre’s account of Nietzsche’s identification of 
the grounding problem in modern morality.30 As discussed in the previous section, MacIntyre largely 
agrees with the Nietzschean diagnosis, although there are important differences between MacIntyre’s 
story and Nietzsche’s which MacIntyre fails to address. According to MacIntyre, the Nietzschean 
diagnosis is no more than the claim that all attempts at rationally grounding morality fail because 
those rationalizations are actually grounded in expressions of a non-rational will. Following from 
this, MacIntyre characterizes the Nietzschean problematic as a creation ex nihilo of new values based 
on individual conceptions of the Good. This approach to the problem, according to MacIntyre, re-
flects the logical extreme of emotivism in morality because it abandons any attempt to use rational-
ity to persuade others in favor of bare, unconcealed expressions of non-rational will. In his eyes, 
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27 Ibid., 226. 
28 Ibid., 118.
29 Ibid., 118. 
30  Where I have presented Nietzsche’s understanding of the grounding problem in morality in terms of Nietzsche’s 
claim that God is dead (GS §108, 125), MacIntyre presents it in terms of Nietzsche’s attack on a rational basis for moral-
ity (GS §335). However, I hold that the attack on modern morality (Kant in particular) which Nietzsche puts forth in GS 
§335 is subsumable as one particular example of philosophizing from within the “shadow  of God” as described above. 
That MacIntyre focuses on this narrow  example rather than the larger issue might be part of why he does not recognize 
the differences between his assessment of the grounding problem in modern morality and Nietzsche’s own (cf. §1 of 
this chapter).
such a radical revolution in morality should not be championed, but treated only as the ultimate con-
sequence of failure. If we cannot regain a unified conception of a telos which can reestablish the 
three-part functionality of ethics, then the Nietzschean problematic is all we will have left. This is 
why he claims that “if Nietzsche wins, he wins by default.”31  In the next section of this chapter, I 
argue that this is not the revolution in morality which Nietzsche champions. First, however, I want 
to address two interpretive problems with MacIntyre’s framing of  the Nietzschean problematic.
 My first criticism of MacIntyre’s treatment of Nietzsche is his sparse presentation of textual 
evidence from Nietzsche’s writings. In After Virtue, we find only two of Nietzsche’s works explicitly 
quoted. The first is section 335 of The Gay Science, from which MacIntyre draws the “Nietzschean 
diagnosis” and the “Nietzschean problematic.” The second is a single quotation taken from The Will 
to Power—a book of Nietzsche’s notes, posthumously cobbled together by his sister for what can 
only be described as dubious purposes.32 Conspicuously absent from MacIntyre’s discussion of Ni-
etzschean ethics is evidence from the two volumes of Nietzsche’s corpus which deal most directly 
with his moral concerns, Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality.33  The problem with 
this sparsity is not that it is dishonest or a sleight-of-hand so much as it is an oversimplification of 
Nietzsche’s thought. It is a mistake to think that any single Nietzsche quotation, taken in isolation, is 
a suitable expression of Nietzsche’s philosophy.34 Given the small amount of support provided for 
his reading, any objections, such as my rejection of the Nietzschean problematic, will deal exten-
sively with content that MacIntyre leaves untouched.
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31 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 257.
32 Ibid., 257-258. Cf. Walter Kaufman, Nietzsche (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) 5-8. 
33 The Genealogy is mentioned in passing, After Virtue, 117.
34 Nietzsche himself complains that people are too quick to take small bits of his thought as theses in GM, P §8. Here 
he states that the entirety of  the third essay of  the Genealogy is an explanation of  only one aphorism.
 Walter Kaufman’s reputation as the original sympathetic Nietzsche scholar in the United States is largely de-
rived from his rejection of Nietzsche scholarship which takes individual statements of Nietzsche's out of context and 
presents them as fully developed theses. In Kaufman’s Nietzsche, this type of critique is consistently leveled at Nietzsche 
commentators throughout, although the prologue entitled “The Nietzsche Legend” is a focused examination of the 
poor scholarship and misguided popular opinion that has plagued Nietzsche’s legacy. Cf. §1 of Kaufman’s intro to GM 
in Walter Kaufman, trans., Basic Writings of  Nietzsche (New York: Modern Library, 2000).
 Second, as Solomon notes, MacIntyre takes Nietzsche’s attack on morality to be an attack on 
all morality—on the concept of morality itself—rather than on one variety (or some varieties) of 
moral thought.35 This is a common conception, no doubt fueled by Nietzsche’s frequent claim that 
he is an “immoralist.” Despite this name, Nietzsche is far from condemning morals in toto. Nietzsche 
rarely talks about moral valuation in general. Instead, he usually talks about particular types of moral-
ity, or modes of moral thought. For instance, in the first treatise of the Genealogy, Nietzsche speaks 
explicitly about two modes of moral valuation. He refers to one variously as noble, master or 
knightly-aristocratic morality and to the other as priestly or slave morality.36 In the Genealogy, it is rela-
tively easy to keep his references straight. However, outside of the Genealogy, the distinction is much 
less obvious—or in the case of earlier works, such as The Gay Science, the distinction may not yet be 
formulated in terms of two opposing value systems. Suffice it  to say, when Nietzsche talks about 
morality, it’s not always clear which morality he means. 
 Taking the Genealogy as a primary example of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, it seems clear 
that Nietzsche means to attack a particular form of moral reasoning rather than morals as such. Re-
cent Nietzsche scholarship embraces this view. For example, in her translation, Maudemarie Clark 
translates the German title Zur Genealogie der Moral as On the Genealogy of Morality rather than the tradi-
tional On the Genealogy of Morals. She states “Moral is used in German to designate either the entirety 
of moral norms, principles, values, or the quality of being moral, moral behavior,” which is closer to 
“morality” in scope.37 Moreover, elsewhere in the Genealogy, the same word is consistently translated 
as “morality” rather than “morals.” Clark’s translation, in seeking to preserve the character of Nietz-
sche’s original language, also makes clear that Nietzsche is not attacking moral conduct in its entirety, 
but only one particular morality which has become dominant. Further, Nietzsche says in the Geneal-
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35 Solomon, Living With Nietzsche, 129. Solomon also notes that Philippa Foot makes this same error.
36 While the distinction between these two modes of moral valuation carries on throughout GM, see especially GM, I 
§6-11. Cf. BGE §195 & 260.
37 Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen, trans. On the Genealogy of Morality (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1998), 119, en.
ogy that he assumes “it has long since been abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of that 
dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last book Beyond Good and Evil. — At least 
this does not mean ‘Beyond Good and Bad.’”(GM, I §17) The distinction Nietzsche is making, be-
tween ‘good and evil’ on one hand and ‘good and bad’ on the other, is the distinction between the 
priestly and knightly-aristocratic modes of valuation, respectively. While going beyond good and evil 
is certainly meant to be an attack on the priestly mode of moral valuation, here Nietzsche suggests 
that this does not rule out moral valuation writ large.38
 Although MacIntyre assumes Nietzsche to be attacking morality as such, rather than the 
norms, principles, values, and behaviors that had come to constitute “morality,” he provides no ar-
guments in support of this. The robust thesis he derives from section 335 of The Gay Science does 
not necessarily follow  from his sparse textual support and his assumption that Nietzsche attacks mo-
rality writ large. In section 335, Nietzsche certainly rejects at least one type of morality, and suggests 
that we replace it  with something that has a heavy focus on individual character. However, if the re-
placement is to careen into moral relativism, as presented in the Nietzschean problematic, this con-
clusion needs to be defended; preferably with some indication of how we should make sense of the 
Nietzschean problematic in relation to other ideas in the Nietzschean corpus. MacIntyre does not 
defend his reading and, in my view, his reading is indefensible.
 In the next section, I argue that the Nietzschean project of value creation is not creation ex 
nihilo, as MacIntyre’s “Nietzschean problematic” suggests. I claim instead that value creation is an 
attempt to realize modern human excellences which take pluralism itself as their cultural starting 
point. This project aims to allow the superior individual to transfigure the cultural material which 
constitutes contemporary values into a new ethics without being forced to choose between a roman-
ticized historical ethics or a culturally ungrounded “moral solipsism.”
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38 While it certainly enjoys the most attention from scholars, one could argue that the Genealogy is only one of a couple 
major attacks Nietzsche makes on morality. The other which immediately springs to mind is The Antichrist. However, The 
Antichrist, like the Genealogy, is an attack on one particular type of  morality.
3. The Creation of Values
For MacIntyre, the fundamental problem of modernity is the inability to ground morality in the face 
of pluralism. MacIntyre takes Nietzsche not only to recognize that modern morality is ungrounded, 
but to embrace this lack of grounding as well. In line with this, MacIntyre outlines the “Nietzschean 
problematic” as an attempt to create values ex nihilo—without regard to tradition or community. I 
have argued that Nietzsche largely shares MacIntyre’s concerns over grounding morality and claimed 
that MacIntyre is mistaken insofar as he takes Nietzsche to embrace our inability to ground morality 
in the context of modern pluralism. In this section, I shall argue that, like MacIntyre, Nietzsche was 
no fan of pluralism. However, unlike MacIntyre, Nietzsche rejects a regression to premodern society 
as an acceptable solution to the challenges posed by pluralism. Instead, Nietzsche’s ethical project 
attempts to embrace modernity as the condition of possibility for a revival of human excellences 
within a pluralist society, thereby moving beyond the stalemate of emotivism. Because MacIntyre 
sees ethics fundamentally as an expression of human excellence as conceived by a unified ethos 
(rather than a description of human flourishing more generally), he would not find my reading of 
Nietzsche to be an acceptable solution to his complaints. However, the reading I put forward shows 
that Nietzsche’s ethical project does not lead to in the relativism MacIntyre describes in the “Nietz-
schean problematic.” 
 To develop my view, I make two claims. First, drawing on Robert Solomon, I argue that Ni-
etzsche’s writing is, in fact, an expression of an ethos, understood in a particular manner. As Solomon 
argues, Nietzsche was writing for a particular community, and in this sense, embarking on an Aristo-
telean project of trying to encapsulate the virtues of his ethos, which is that of the nineteenth cen-
tury artist and intellectual. Unlike the Aristotelean polis, this ethos is certainly not unified in the sense 
MacIntyre requires. However, it opens the door for an ethics which is grounded in relation to the 
ethical individual’s society. Second, I argue that, while this does not solve the problematic fragmenta-
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tion of modern society, Nietzsche’s project is still able to find the impetus for reviving an ethics cen-
tered on human excellences within modern culture. As Nietzsche sees it, the inability to unify culture 
follows, not from a loss of telos to which all members of a society conform, but from a loss of so-
ciopolitical influence which allows for one group to require conformity.
 Before dealing with these two claims, I want to argue for a more nuanced understanding of 
Nietzsche’s relation to pluralism, which follows from the Enlightenment. Nietzsche, like MacIntyre, 
was no fan of pluralism. However, Nietzsche’s call to individual integrity seems to presuppose plu-
ralism. MacIntyre takes this individualism to support his reading that Nietzsche’s work is the epit-
ome of modern pluralism. However, I think this is too simplistic an interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
view, which is more intricate than a straightforward ‘for or against’ attitude. I claim that Nietzsche 
dislikes pluralism insofar as it fractures social cohesion. However, while Nietzsche agrees with Mac-
Intyre that, historically, a unified ethos played a central role in human flourishing, he rejects MacIn-
tyre’s claim that this unity is a necessary condition for a viable ethics. In support of this claim, I want 
to show that, while Nietzsche is critical of pluralism, he also engages with it in order to grapple with 
its problems rather than avoid them.
 Nietzsche’s dislike of pluralism is clear in his early writings, where he laments the onset of 
democracy. While Nietzsche’s disdain for democracy is closely linked with his critique of herd men-
tality, in Human, All too Human he also points out that, as monarchies and centralized religion decline, 
the social cohesion which follows from the reverence of such institutions is lost (HAH, §472). What 
Nietzsche describes is a shift in the role of governing institutions (the state and religion). As democ-
racy takes hold, the people lose their reverence for those institutions. They no longer legislate life as 
thoroughly, and “private persons” develop.39 Earlier in Human, All too Human,  Nietzsche argues that 
the role of government in modernity is changing, it is becoming a compromise rather than a top-
down legislation (HAH, §450). These remarks are written in a tone meant to emphasize the histori-
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39 Nietzsche says he deliberately uses the term “private person” as opposed to “individual.”
cal fact of the matter, but it is clear that Nietzsche sees that a certain way of life is coming to an end, 
because the social cohesion which was its underpinning is coming apart. In this sense, Nietzsche 
views the coming of pluralism, the increasing weight given to the opinions of the “private person,” 
in much the same way MacIntyre sees it.
 However, Nietzsche’s critique of pluralism diverges from MacIntyre’s in two important re-
spects. First, by associating pluralism and democracy, Nietzsche points to a fundamental difference 
between his and MacIntyre’s understanding of unity within an ethos. Unlike MacIntyre, Nietzsche 
sees any unity in an ethos as legislated by the powerful in society, be they the Athenian nobility or the 
Medieval Papacy and monarchies. Whereas MacIntyre views all people in these societies as sharing 
an understanding of their telos, Nietzsche argues that this shared telos derives, in part, from an inabil-
ity to think otherwise on the part of the politically weak.40 For Nietzsche, the unity of an ancient 
ethos stemmed from the singularity of social and political power within the society in question. As I 
will argue shortly, this distinction is central to understanding how the “Nietzschean problematic” 
fails to capture Nietzsche’s modern ethical project.
 Second, unlike MacIntyre, Nietzsche does not see the problems presented by pluralism as 
unsurpassable. At the end of his discussion about the decline of the state, Nietzsche says, “the 
prospect resulting from this certain decline is not an unhappy one in every respect”(HAH §472). 
Nietzsche argues that, just as civic life eclipsed the import of family life, so too a new way of life 
would come to eclipse civic life after the state’s decline. As with their different takes on the ground-
ing problem of morality, Nietzsche sees the modern condition as transitional, whereas MacIntyre 
sees it as a problematic dead end. In keeping with this view, Nietzsche thinks that despite the prob-
lems pluralism presents for grounding morality, it must be embraced and overcome or transfigured, 
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40 This can be seen in HAH §472, where Nietzsche talks about the necessity of top-down legislation by institutions and a 
powerful elite, as well as HAH §474, where Nietzsche states that it is in the interest of the Athenian polis to inhibit and 
cripple the culture and education of the people “in order to bind all generations and keep them at one level.” This intro-
duces an interesting dichotomy, between what is for the benefit of the polis and what is for the benefit of the citizens 
within that polis. Nietzsche wants to keep these two questions distinct, whereas MacIntyre does not address them as dis-
tinct issues.
rather than being shied away from. This attitude can be seen in the introduction Nietzsche appended 
to The Birth of Tragedy entitled “Attempt at Self-Criticism.” Here, Nietzsche notes that, in order to 
revivify human excellence in modern culture, The Birth of Tragedy tried to find evidence of the tradi-
tion of Greek tragedy in modernity (i.e., in Wagner). Nietzsche then points out that this is why The 
Birth of Tragedy, with its hatred of the present in favor of an idealized past, in the final analysis is 
merely romanticism (BOT, P §7). With this passage, Nietzsche evidences his affinity with MacInty-
rean concerns regarding modernity, but he also rejects adopting anything other than a modern solu-
tion to the problems of modernity. Specifically, Nietzsche notes that an attempt to revivify the 
Greek way of life fails as a solution to modern problems. In other words, The Birth of Tragedy is 
problematic insofar as it looks backward, in a MacIntyrean spirit, to find a solution to the problems 
of modernity. Looking back on the book in 1886, Nietzsche finds such a solution problematic be-
cause its denial of the present is life-denying, and thus fails to overcome the impending problem of 
nihilism which he has come to recognize.
 This rejection of a MacIntyrean solution is congruent with Nietzsche’s broader thesis about 
the problems of modernity which I discussed in section one of this chapter. Nietzsche sees moder-
nity’s problems as part of a larger story, one which begins sooner (with the dominance of the Chris-
tian worldview rather than the Enlightenment) and can lead to a more problematic end than the 
stalemate of emotivism MacIntyre identifies (the chaos that follows from unleashing the ressentiment-
filled masses from the restraint imposed by Judeo-Christian morality). In relation to my rejection of 
the “Nietzschean problematic,” what is important to note is that Nietzsche does not reject a move 
back to premodern social commitments because he rejects the social grounding of ethics in favor of 
radical individualism. Instead, Nietzsche rejects MacIntyre’s move because, although he sees a similar 
problem, he also sees that a move to premodern society is an inadequate solution to the very prob-
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lem identified.41 Nietzsche’s project of value creation is an attempt to provide an alternative to mod-
ern pluralism without a resort to a premodern ethical system. I claim that MacIntyre misidentifies 
the goal of Nietzschean value creation. The creation of new  values is not an attempt to create values 
without grounding now that the grounding problem in morality has been revealed. It is an attempt 
to create values which can be found in the present social context, given that the Enlightenment pro-
ject to universally ground values has failed. Nietzschean value creation is not divorced from its social 
context, although it takes as its starting point a society which MacIntyre thinks precludes a coherent 
ethics.
 According to MacIntyre, Nietzsche’s project of value creation can only establish an individu-
alist—and therefore relativist—ethics out of the rubble of modern moral theory because pluralist 
modernity provides no cohesive ethos to express. In response to this charge, Solomon suggests that, 
even though Nietzsche was not capable of expressing the ethos of modernity, because modernity is 
made of many ethé, his ethics is an attempt to make good the values of a particular group in modern 
society, “namely the community of disaffected academics and intellectuals.”42  Nietzsche was not 
writing for modern Europe as a whole, but for a select elite within modern Europe. This view of 
Nietzsche actually parallels the Aristotelean project insofar as Aristotle’s ethics also sought to em-
body the excellences of the elite in his society. However, this comparison is problematic in two im-
portant ways. First, the Athenian aristocracy whom Aristotle ‘wrote for’ were a cohesive group. 
Modernity and the intellectuals and artists Nietzsche is writing to are not. Second, the values of 
Athenian aristocrats, and the ethics of Aristotle, by and large, supported the society out of which 
they grew. They reinforced the ethos that was their foundation. Nietzsche’s virtue ethics, on the other 
hand, does not seek to reinforce the morality of his day. In fact, Nietzsche paints the moral tradition 
of his day as the enemy of virtue. Despite these problems, Solomon still holds that we can sensibly 
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41 At best we could say that a move back toward premodern society is an avoidance of the problems presented by plural-
ism rather than a solution to them.
42 Solomon, Living with Nietzsche, 133.
view the Nietzschean ethical project as an attempt to express a particular ethos, so long as we view 
modernity as made up of many ethé. 43 He says, “Ethics is an expression of an ethos even if that ethos 
is the scattered romantic sensibility of a few hundred brilliant and not-so-brilliant misfits scattered 
around the hills and lakes of  Europe.”44
 While I agree with Solomon that we can view Nietzsche’s ethics as an attempt to express the 
ethos of the nineteenth century artist, MacIntyre would find this response insufficient. If Nietzsche is 
merely encapsulating the virtues of a small and scattered group of artists, then he is merely emoting 
in favor of his own moral viewpoint within the context of a society which still has many incommen-
surable moral commitments. Such emoting is precisely the problem of modern morality which Mac-
Intyre describes, and which I have suggested Nietzsche is attempting to move beyond. In MacIn-
tyre’s view, even if we read Nietzsche as embodying the virtues of this scattered ethos  within a society 
built of many ethé, this is still evidence that something fundamental to ethics has been lost. However, 
I think that this reveals MacIntyre as making impossible demands of modern culture on the basis of 
an idealized view of the past.45 The ethos expressed by Aristotelean ethics was unified, but only in the 
Nietzschean sense. That is to say, the unified culture of the Athenian polis was the culture of the 
Athenian nobility, who had the sociopolitical influence to treat it as the defining culture of Athens. 
This ethos explicitly excludes Athenian slaves, women, or non land-owning men. To the extent that 
those groups are unified within the ethos of the polis, that unity is forced upon them from higher so-
cial classes. Given that the unity of the ancient polis does not derive from a shared commitment to 
the human telos, but rather merely from its imposition by a sociopolitical power structure, the lack of 
a shared commitment to the human telos in modernity need not in itself preclude a modern revival 
of aretaic ethics. As I mentioned above, Nietzsche rejects MacIntyre’s understanding of the unified 
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45 Solomon agrees with this accusation, saying, “are there ever such unified cultures, or is their very possibility a myth? 
(Think of the fiction of ethnically pure Japan, or look at how readily unified religions slip into warring sects.)” Living with 
Nietzsche, 132.
cultures of the past. I claim that in this rejection we can find a different understanding of the sense 
of group identity required for an ethics which, according to Nietzsche, can still be made good in a 
modern context.
 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche discusses the cultural identity which underlies any virtue 
ethics as necessarily arising from a conflict or tension between a social group and a threatening other 
(BGE §262). As Nietzsche describes it, the things a culture takes as virtues come to be seen in that 
light because of the role they play in distinguishing the group in question from outsiders or inferiors 
(real or perceived). This view  seems to have the weight of history behind it. The virtues of the 
Athenian polis arose out of political, economic, and territorial competition between Greek city states. 
The virtues of Medieval Christianity arose in the context of external pagan religions. In each case, 
the values espoused by the ethos were the values of the elite. As discussed above, Nietzsche saw the 
fact that these ethé became unified as resulting from the exercise of sociopolitical power, not from 
some form of consent. Indeed, in each case we do not need to look far to find significant portions 
of the population who might have benefitted from some other conception of the good life (i.e., 
Athenian slaves, serfs at the bottom rung of the feudal system). Thus, while these ethé  were unified, 
they were only unified in relation to other groups, and within their own group the ethics espoused 
only offered virtue to certain subsets of the society. Those excluded from the virtuous life by birth 
did not support their ethos because they valued its telos, but because they had no ability to do other-
wise. MacIntyre’s discussion of the role a unified ethos plays in ethics misses this point entirely. Ni-
etzsche does not, and as a result he sees that the unity of these historical ethé is not a necessary part 
of their ethics, but a contingent fact of political history. The key to the social grounding of an ethics 
is a small group seeing itself  as different from outside groups.
 In this sense, Nietzsche thinks that the social unity of a small group (in opposition to one or 
many others) is possible in the context of modernity (BGE §200). In contrast to past societies, 
which Nietzsche characterizes with the two fundamental types—noble and slave moralities—Nietz-
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sche sees the modern person as characterized by a combination of these types. He describes modern 
humans as having opposite or contradictory “drives and value standards that fight each other and 
rarely permit each other any rest.”(BGE §200) This internal conflict is caused by a “heritage of mul-
tiple origins,” or put differently, by modern pluralism. It is this conflict which gives rise to the two 
ethical types Nietzsche claims are at issue in modernity: the mediocre bonhomme and the superior in-
dividual. Nietzsche distinguishes these two types differently from the noble/slave moral taxonomy 
seen in Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy. Whereas noble and slave moralities are distinguished 
by active and reactive valuation respectively, as well as by the social status of their community, the 
mediocre and the superior individual are distinguished by their reaction to the internal conflict of 
their pluralist heritage. According to Nietzsche, “both types belong together and owe their origin to 
the same causes.”(BGE §200) The average human will constitute the weaker or more mediocre type, 
whose “most profound desire is that the war they are should come to an end.”(BGE §200). Nietz-
sche says they end this internal conflict with a tranquilizing happiness, one which prevents them 
from being disturbed. The superior individual, on the other hand, does not seek to end the internal 
conflict of pluralism with a totalizing worldview. While Nietzsche, in section 200 of Beyond Good and 
Evil, does not give an explicit account of superior individuals, he does say that they have a mastery 
of waging war against themselves. He clarifies this metaphor saying, “in other words, self-control, 
[and] self-outwitting has been inherited or cultivated, too”(BGE §200). Whereas the weak and me-
diocre bonhomme seeks escape in a happiness which Nietzsche views as hedonistic nihilism, the supe-
rior individual is able to reflect upon the turmoil of modernity and has the discipline to try to trans-
figure it into something which need not be escaped, but can instead be embraced.
 It is my contention that the superior individual’s ethical project is related to an ethos unified 
by tension in much the same way that Nietzsche sees Aristotelean ethics as arising from the competi-
tion between city states in ancient Greece. That is to say, the superior individual’s virtues are 
grounded in an ethos which is delimited and unified by the tension, perceived by a small group of 
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elites, between their own way of life and society at large. This is certainly not a unified ethos in the 
sense MacIntyre intends. However, for Nietzsche, the overarching unity MacIntyre emphasizes is an 
artifact of the political and economic power of the Athenian polis (and the Nicomachean Ethics  only 
applies to a small subset of  that society).
 Aristotle’s ethics draws upon a social group which was already well defined and whose values 
he articulated, but by no means created himself. While the artists and academics Nietzsche writes for 
are not yet a similar group of elites, Nietzsche sees his project as an attempt to articulate the possi-
bility of a new group of elites who can revive the virtues of excellence in modern society. Nietzsche 
was not writing for an already existing cohesive group, but attempting to be the catalyst which would 
unify a group he saw as latent in modern European culture. For Nietzsche, if these elites are able to 
create new  values, it will be in the context of their seeing themselves as different from the others, 
the mediocre herd, in just the same way as the Athenian nobility saw  themselves as other than their 
slaves, the Spartans, or barbarians. What makes them other is the hallmark of Nietzschean virtue: it 
is the self-control and self-mastery which allows the superior individual to be passionately engaged 
but also to avoid being unreflectively engulfed in the current of  their passions.
 Contrary to MacIntyre’s assertions, this project is not the creation of values ex nihilo. Nietz-
sche makes clear that both the mediocre and superior individuals arise from the same cultural condi-
tions (BGE §200). The difference is, where the mediocre are overwhelmed by the conflict which is 
their heritage, the superior individual has the ability to gain a critical distance from it. This distance 
does not involve a “stepping out” of society, resulting in moral relativism. Rather, it  allows for the 
superior individual to embrace the “drives and value standards” which comprise both the modern 
self and modern culture and transfigure them into something new. Nietzsche’s superior individual is 
not a new type of human, completely cut off from modern problems, but a modern human, who is 
defined by his or her virtuous response to the problems of modernity. As I will emphasize in the 
next chapter, the response to these problems involves engaging with the traditions which are the 
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heritage of the modern condition insofar as the conflict between these traditions constitutes the ini-
tial stock of meaning to be transfigured by the project of value creation. The new table of values 
legislated by the superior individual is made out of aspects of noble and slave morality, transfigured 
into a new and distinctly modern virtue ethics.
 MacIntyre would certainly argue that, even if a small community of artists and intellectu-
als—following Nietzsche’s advice—engaged in such a project, this would only be one more frag-
ment in an already fragmented society. This is necessarily the case, as even Nietzsche’s exposition of 
the superior individual, who arises from the same context as the mediocre bonhomme, is fundamen-
tally elitist. While this is true, I don’t see any alternative, and it is not clear to me that there ever was 
an alternative in the first place. The virtues of Athens, in which MacIntyre puts so much stock, were 
also fundamentally elitist. Any unity it had was achieved via a confluence of a cohesive ethos among 
the aristocracy and the political power to treat that ethos as the Athenian culture. Nietzsche’s ethics 
does not solve the grounding problems presented by modern pluralism, but it does engage with 
them and attempt to use those problems as an impetus to revive an ethics which focuses on the pur-
suit of excellence in modern society. Without a project similar to this, we are left in the MacIntyrean 
position of lamenting a bygone age of human flourishing with no recourse to improvement in mod-
ern life.
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Chapter 2:
Foot, Naturalism, and Proscription
Philippa Foot published three pieces critiquing Nietzsche’s ethics.46 These pieces are all united by 
Foot’s attempt to understand what Nietzsche means when he calls himself an “immoralist.” Foot 
thinks that understanding Nietzsche’s immoralism provides good reason to reject his ethics. While 
Foot’s exposition of Nietzsche’s immoralism has many facets, my response will focus on one which 
appears prominently in two of her works (“Nietzsche’s Immoralism” and Natural Goodness), Nietz-
sche’s inability to declare certain acts as categorically unjust.47 Foot’s motivating concern is the geno-
cides witnessed in the twentieth century, in particular during World War II. I claim that, while Foot is 
correct that Nietzsche is unable to label certain acts as categorically unjust, he is able to respond to 
Foot’s concerns.
 In section one, I examine the differences between Foot’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions of 
naturalist ethics. In my view, the differences between Foot’s and Nietzsche’s ethical outlooks prompt 
Foot to wrongly assess the nature of Nietzsche’s ethical critique. With these differences in hand, it 
should be clear both why Foot thinks Nietzsche’s ethics does not make adequate room for justice 
and how, despite Foot’s claims, Nietzsche does have a reply to her concerns. In section two, I reject 
Foot’s reading of a passage which she uses as evidence to support the claim that Nietzsche gives too 
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much leeway to the superior individual. In my view, this passage does not represent sanction, indul-
gence, or reprimand of the nobles discussed, but is primarily a historical discussion. Finally, in sec-
tion three, I examine Foot’s discussion of what she calls Nietzsche’s ‘personalism’—which is her 
take on Nietzsche’s perspectivism. I argue that Foot’s ‘personalism’ is inadequate because it  fails to 
get outside of the agent-action dualism Nietzschean perspectivism attempts to reject, and suggest 
my own reading of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in its place. Following from this discussion, I show 
that Nietzschean ethics neither explicitly supports injustice, nor is inimical to justice generally.
1. Naturalism and Egalitarianism
Like MacIntyre, Foot mistakenly takes Nietzsche’s critique of morality to target morality as such. 
Foot’s refutations of Nietzsche often assume that he is speaking of morality in general rather than in 
a particular historical and social context. Divorcing Nietzsche’s arguments from these contexts dis-
torts their meaning. Foot’s tendency to misrepresent Nietzsche in this manner follows from the dif-
ferences between hers and Nietzsche’s divergent naturalistic commitments. While Nietzsche and 
Foot both base their ethics in a naturalistic outlook, Nietzsche’s naturalism requires an attention to 
sociohistorical detail that Foot’s naturalism does not.
 The term ‘naturalism’ means many things to philosophers, but for Foot and Nietzsche it  
means something quite similar. In the introduction to Natural Goodness, Foot declares that her project 
will provide an account of “natural goodness and defect in living things.”48 In a sense, this is a mod-
ern statement of an Aristotelean concept: what it means to be good is to be a good example of 
one’s species, which in turn means a ‘well functioning’ example of that species. It seems to me that 
this is a good characterization of the naturalistic attitude that both Foot and Nietzsche take toward 
ethical values. Foot, especially in Natural Goodness, is interested in a naturalistic account of the good 
based upon a functional conception of what being human entails. Nietzsche’s ethics has a similar 
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naturalistic interest. Although they arrive at their positions from different beginnings, both Foot and 
Nietzsche ultimately argue that ethics is grounded in facts about the natural world.49  Despite this 
shared commitment concerning the constitutive role that the natural world plays in ethics, Foot and 
Nietzsche arrive at very different ethical conclusions. For Foot, naturalism is egalitarian, whereas for 
Nietzsche, it is not.
 Foot claims that for any species, “The way an individual [member of that species] should be is 
determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance, and reproduction: in most species 
involving defence [sic], and in some the rearing of young.”50  This holds for humans in just the same 
way it holds for plants and non-human animals.51 For Foot, the way a given species functions out-
lines the range in which we can say that a given member of the species is either good or defective. 
These are what she calls “natural norms.” For example, ‘good roots’ are good insofar as they do all 
the things roots ought to do (i.e., anchor a tree so it can grow tall, gather nutrients from the soil, 
etc.). Foot then argues that “there is no change in the meaning of ‘good’ between the word as it appears in ‘good 
roots’ and as it appears in ‘good dispositions of the human will.’”52  In other words, moral claims about the 
Good refer to goodness as defined functionally by natural norms. Foot uses this move to ground 
moral imperatives, such that “the actions of anyone who does not ϕ when ϕ-ing is the only rational 
thing to do are ipso facto defective.”53  We could therefore summarize Foot’s idea of naturalist ethics as 
relying on a functional explanation of human actions in order to outline the ways that characteristic 
traits of the human define excellences toward which it is rational for each human to strive. In this 
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sense, Foot’s ethics is grounded by a teleology of excellence in function. The egalitarianism inherent 
in Foot’s naturalism derives from the fact that she thinks there is one functional description which 
applies equally to all humans. For her, the natural norms which outline flourishing do not change on 
account of differences between individual humans. Foot does not argue for this one-teleology-per-
species view so much as she assumes it.54
 Nietzsche’s naturalism is similar to Foot’s in that he thinks we can judge a trait or characteris-
tic in an organism based upon its function in the life of that organism. However, unlike Foot, Nietz-
sche does not believe that this function-based view is ultimately grounded in the need for survival 
and reproduction. Heavily emphasized in Nietzsche’s writing is the imagery of life forms growing, 
asserting, and expressing themselves. Unlike Foot, who takes the telos  of a life form to be its capacity 
for self-preservation and its ability to reproduce, Nietzsche thinks that the “really fundamental in-
stinct of life... aims at the expansion of power and, wishing for that, [life] frequently risks and even sac-
rifices self-preservation.”(GS §349) It is this expansive force of life that Nietzsche terms ‘the will to 
power.’ In the same section, he argues that doctrines of self preservation are actually symptoms of 
distress and a temporary limitation of one’s will to power. Elsewhere he claims that self preservation 
is merely a common side-effect of expressing one’s will to power (BGE § 13). Either way, it is clear 
that the determining factor in Nietzsche’s naturalism is the will to power of an organism or group of 
organisms, not its will to survival.
 The expression of one’s will to power, however, depends upon the contingent differences 
between humans—differences in talent, ability, social status, appearance, and historical context (to 
name just a few). Just as each oak tree grows towards the light but takes a different shape in doing 
so, every human being innately wants to express his or her will to power but will do so differently 
depending upon his or her strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, within Nietzsche’s naturalism, what 
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promotes the goals of the weak is not the same as what promotes the goals of the strong, and what 
promotes the goals of the human species as a whole may not coincide with either.55 Just as Foot as-
sumes rather than argues for the egalitarian implications of her naturalism, Nietzsche presupposes 
that the differences between individuals matter. If what we do is express our own wills to power, 
then the ambidextrous, colorblind, and those born with perfect pitch will necessarily express their 
wills to power differently.
 Up until now, the will to power has been discussed in a purely descriptive manner. Foot’s 
natural norms are descriptive, but they also gain normativity through her claim that there is no dis-
tinction to be made between description of natural function and normativity. That is to say, our 
natural function sets clear boundaries, and any particular moral code must conform to those bound-
ary conditions. According to Foot, the will to power fails to make this same move, because any ac-
tion can be reduced to an instance of it.56 If this is the case, even traits we would want to say are 
vicious or deficient can—in some circumstances at least—be explained as an expression of an indi-
vidual’s will to power. Thus, while the will to power offers a descriptive alternative to Foot’s survival-
based natural norms, it appears to offer no normative alternative.
 Christine Swanton objects to this reading of the will to power, arguing that, while it is true of 
the genus, it is not so for the species.57 In Swanton’s terminology, the ‘genus’ is the will to power as 
such, whereas a ‘species’ of the will to power would be a particular action (character trait, skill, etc.) 
viewed as an expression of one’s will to power.58 According to Swanton, a distinction between genus 
and species allows for the will to power to be normative at the level of individual instances. She 
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proposes that we categorize different expressions of the will to power in terms of the degree to 
which they are “distorting,” which, for Nietzsche, means life-denying or unhealthy. In other words, 
built into Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power is the assumption that not all expressions of 
the will to power are equal. The will to power is not only descriptive, but normative by way of estab-
lishing a concept of excellence in its expression. As Swanton puts it, excellent (“undistorted”) ex-
pressions of the will to power work towards being more life-affirming, healthy, or both, whereas dis-
torted expressions do not.59 Because we can only judge something more life-affirming or healthy by 
way of comparing it with what came before it, this reading necessarily takes account of the historical 
and physical particulars of the individual agent.60  Note that, on this reading, Nietzsche arrives at 
normativity in a similar manner to Foot. Both assert that their natural descriptions have an inbuilt 
conception of excellence. In my view, this is the correct way to read the will to power, because it is 
in this manner that Nietzsche orients much of his criticism. For example, Christianity is not criti-
cized for failure to express its will to power. Rather, Nietzsche critiques Christianity precisely be-
cause its expression of the will to power is ultimately life-denying. Although Foot rejects it, Nietz-
sche’s understanding of the will to power does provide a normative yardstick in the form of less dis-
torted expressions of  an individual’s will to power.
 Finally, Nietzsche sees the human animal historically. Historical episodes leave their mark 
upon the species, by way of epochal changes in culture. For example, what it meant for a person to 
flourish in Homeric Greece is not what it means to flourish in modern Europe because these two 
settings for action are on either side of a major epochal shift in culture—the slave revolt in morality. 
Nietzsche claims that slave morality made us deep and interesting animals (GM, I §6). Slave morality 
inspired a self-concern and self-scrutiny which was not a feature of humanity under the previous 
“noble” morality. With the turn inward inspired by the rise of slave morality, the fundamental char-
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acter of the human animal has changed. As a result, modern individuals who would exercise their 
will to power excellently must engage in this self-scrutiny in such a way that it aids rather than inhib-
its their flourishing. By contrast, in societies which predate the slave revolt in morality, individuals 
would not have the same compulsion for self-scrutiny which Nietzsche thinks has developed over 
the past few millennia.61  Thus it would make no sense to say that an individual of ancient times 
scrutinized themselves in such a way that promoted their flourishing, whereas a rich understanding 
of oneself is a necessary condition of flourishing in modernity. In this sense, sociohistorical 
changes, too, matter within the context of  Nietzsche’s naturalism. 
 However, even though our understanding of human flourishing develops over time, this 
model for human flourishing is not culturally relative. That is to say, while certain traits which are 
necessary for flourishing in modernity arose within slave morality, Nietzsche still sees slave morality 
itself as incompatible with human flourishing. However, our modern culture, influenced by two mil-
lennia of slave morality, makes up the backdrop for the actions of the new superior individual.62 As 
a result, human flourishing in the context of modernity must account for the self-scrutiny engen-
dered by slave morality despite the fact that Nietzsche finds good reason to reject slave morality as a 
model for flourishing in its own right. This interaction between slave morality and human flourish-
ing is a good example of how, for Nietzsche, human flourishing necessarily takes account of its so-
ciohistorical context, but does not collapse into cultural relativism.
 Foot’s naturalism, by comparison, simply does not account for culture in this manner. Her 
claims about natural norms are grounded in empirical, logical, and biological truths. For Foot’s natu-
ralism, culture only comes into play insofar as humans are necessarily social animals, and thus we 
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naturally have some norms which are other-regarding.63  Beyond this, specific cultural issues are 
merely the playing out of the natural norms of our species. In other words, Foot’s system sets natu-
ral boundaries that aim to delineate the contents of the moral. Within those boundaries, culture is 
free to set up a moral schema, but on her view, those boundaries are effectively universal. As we will 
see, Nietzsche’s refusal to offer universal proscriptions about moral issues follows from the fact that 
he differs from Foot on this issue. Foot does state that her system of natural norms only functions 
insofar as we think of a species as an unchanging still frame in a particular time and place (although, 
of course, over time that still frame would require updates as the species evolves).64 However, her 
discussion of this change leaves out any mention of cultural change as a suitable reason to reassess 
our conception of flourishing. That Foot does not recognize the role culture plays for Nietzsche is 
evident when she argues that Nietzsche is especially dangerous because he was talking about human-
ity rather than angels, Martians or Neanderthals.65 Foot implies that, by virtue of the nature of our 
species, proscriptions naturally follow. For Nietzsche, this is simply not the case. Foot’s reading of 
Nietzsche ignores a basic commitment of his naturalism: that differences between cultures and indi-
viduals within the species must inform our conception of the necessary conditions for human flour-
ishing.
 Perhaps the best way to characterize the difference between Foot’s naturalism and Nietz-
sche’s naturalism is as follows: Foot thinks a naturalist account of the function of a species is suffi-
cient to develop what she calls natural norms; in the case of humans, these norms include proscrip-
tions which form the boundaries for any system of morality. Nietzsche, on the other hand, rejects 
the idea that physical and biological facts about our species can play such a determining role in out-
lining normativity, notwithstanding certain interpretations of his thought to this effect. This is not to 
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claim that they are not involved, but for Nietzsche, a full naturalist description would need some ac-
count of  the time, place, and individuals (or groups of  individuals) involved.
2. Pranksome Nobles and Cruel Monsters
Foot’s primary attack on Nietzsche—his inability to make categorical statements about morality—is 
most forceful when she discusses problems of injustice, particularly genocide. As I argued in section 
one of this chapter, I think that Foot and Nietzsche are largely at an impasse in regard to whether 
certain acts can be categorically sanctioned because of the different conclusions they draw from 
their naturalistic assumptions. If we accept Foot’s naturalism, we will also accept its egalitarian pre-
suppositions about humanity. From this standpoint, Nietzsche’s ideas about the necessary differ-
ences between people seem either a hinderance to moral reasoning or else they are irrelevant. How-
ever, if we side with Nietzsche and see our innate differences as a determining factor in a naturalist 
ethical view, then Foot’s claims seem idealistic. However, Foot does not simply argue that her theo-
ries are incompatible with Nietzsche’s. She claims that Nietzsche’s ethics is “sinister,” “threatening,” 
and a “poisonous doctrine.”66  In other words, Foot thinks that Nietzsche’s ethics not only handles 
questions of injustice poorly because it cannot make categorical statements, but also that following a 
Nietzschean ethics will lead to injustice. This worry follows from what Foot sees as the indulgences 
Nietzsche is willing to make for the actions of the superior individual. In this section I examine the 
textual support Foot presents in support of her worry. I argue against Foot’s claim that Nietzsche 
writes “indulgently” about murder and rape performed by ancient nobility on the grounds that Foot 
misreads the passage she cites in support. My own examination of this passage suggests that Nietz-
sche in fact shares Foot’s concerns about the cruelty which was commonplace in ancient times.
 Foot’s primary piece of evidence in support of Nietzsche’s indulgent view of the superior 
individual is section 11 of the Genealogy’s first treatise, in which Nietzsche describes ancient nobility’s 
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practice of raiding and pillaging neighboring societies. Citing this passage, Foot argues that “while 
[Nietzsche] was ready to castigate certain types of individuals as cruel monsters or licentious beasts 
(having no time for either), he spoke indulgently of the nobles of earlier times, whom he saw as 
‘pranksome’… in performing acts of plunder, murder, and rape.”67  Foot offers this passage as an 
example of the problems inherent in arguing that actions are not bad in themselves, and therefore 
cannot be categorically rejected as immoral. Given the abhorrent nature of these acts, Foot thinks 
we should find Nietzsche’s lighthearted discussion of them troubling. However, Foot’s conclusion 
fails to accommodate Nietzsche’s distinction between questions of origin and value which plays an 
important role throughout the Genealogy, and in section 11 of  the first treatise in particular.
 In my view, if we account for the distinction Nietzsche makes between questions of origin 
and questions of value, the passage Foot cites has almost the opposite implications. In the preface to 
the Genealogy, Nietzsche claims to pursue two different questions. The first is a question of the origin 
of values, and the second is that of the value of values (GM, P §3). Although he pursues both ques-
tions in tandem throughout the Genealogy, for Nietzsche, they are separate lines of inquiry with di-
vergent answers.68 For Nietzsche, the question of origin is factual. In the Genealogy he pursues it pri-
marily by way of etymological and philological evidence, but what he presents is a sort of philo-
sophical anthropology of premodern cultures. The question of the value of values, however, is es-
sentially an ethical and meta-ethical question. In my view, Foot doesn’t distinguish between these 
lines of thought in the Genealogy, and because section 11 pursues both questions simultaneously, she 
skews Nietzsche’s remarks.
  Nietzsche says that when these nobles go out to pillage, what they are doing is stepping out 
of the social constraints of their society and providing themselves a release for their more violent 
urges. He says, “they step back into the innocence of the beast-of-prey conscience, as jubilant mon-
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sters, who perhaps walk away from a hideous succession of murder, arson, rape, torture with such 
high spirits and equanimity that it seems as if they have only played a student prank”(GM, I §11). 
Nietzsche is not saying that he sees their acts as mere pranks. He is reporting the nobles’ own self-
conception. Nietzsche uses different terms to voice his own view of the nobles’ raiding, such as 
“uncaged beasts of prey,” “jubilant monsters,” and “their appalling lightheartedness and depth of 
desire in all destruction.”(GM, I §11) These judgments indicate that, while Nietzsche does think the 
nobles themselves were not bothered by their actions, Nietzsche is (or would be if they were 
adopted as values in modern times). In order to better grasp Nietzsche’s tone in this passage, I think 
it is helpful to separate out his two interests—origin and value—which appear intertwined in this 
discussion.
 In the context of the Genealogy more broadly, section 11 of the first treatise primarily dis-
cusses a question of origin, not a question of value. Nietzsche tells a story of interaction between 
early ‘noble’ and ‘slave’ societies. The strong nobles go on raids of weaker (slave) societies to vent 
their strength. Whereas outsiders whom the nobles raid are merely afterthoughts for the ancient no-
bles, the ancient nobles are a tyrannical threat to the weak (or slave) societies. Given this difference 
in the way each group regards the other, it is only natural that the nobles, who are very self-
concerned, define ‘good’ in terms of themselves, whereas the slaves’ concern for their own safety 
causes them to define ‘good’ negatively in terms of those things which do not embody the ‘evil’ 
threat of the ancient nobles. Nietzsche’s aim in telling this story is to describe a historical scenario in 
which the stark difference between moralities which he proposes could possibly arise. In this sense, 
Nietzsche’s description aims at presenting a philosophical anthropology rather than an evaluative 
assessment of  historical practices.
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 When, in section 11, Nietzsche does discuss the ancient nobles with evaluative language, he 
is notably ambivalent.69 Above, I noted that he says they are “jubilant monsters” who are simultane-
ously lighthearted and appalling. He also describes ancient times as a “contradiction” between “the 
glorious but likewise so gruesome, [and] so violent”(GM, I §11). From all of this it is clear that, 
while Nietzsche finds something to respect in the nobles, he also finds something deeply troubling. 
More to the point, those things he finds troubling are precisely the things Foot claims he is indulgent 
of: the nobles’ violent actions and their seeming lack of concern for their own cruelty. Nietzsche 
certainly respects and admires ancient nobility. However, this respect has nothing to do with their 
violence toward other (slave) cultures. In fact, Nietzsche sees the tension between the nobles’ pursuit 
of excellence and their violence as “the problem of the noble ideal in itself”(GM, I §16). In other 
words, this tension must be resolved by the superior individual in order to make good new “noble” 
ideals in a modern context. Insofar as Foot is concerned that Nietzsche’s veneration of ancient no-
bility celebrates their more inhumane qualities as well as their storied achievements, I think her con-
cern is misplaced. If my reading is correct, Nietzsche is no more indulgent of these acts than any 
other typical modern person. The major difference is that Nietzsche wants to hold aside evaluation 
of such acts so that he can investigate the history of value judgments themselves without presup-
posing any conclusions. Thus, while he agrees with Foot that the raiding parties of ancient times 
were terrible by modern standards, he does not immediately move to evaluate them. Further, contra 
Foot’s reading, Nietzsche’s pursuit of a value-neutral description is not an injunction against evaluat-
ing the cruelty of the ancient nobles from a modern standpoint. An attempt at value-neutral philo-
sophical anthropology is simply part of what Nietzsche sees as responsible genealogical method—
one which separates questions of value and questions of origin. Therefore, Nietzsche’s reporting of 
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the ancient nobles’ lighthearted attitude is a far cry from Foot’s claim that Nietzsche presents a “poi-
sonous doctrine” which encourages those who see themselves as superior individuals to do what 
they will with the rest of  us.70
 
3. The ʻWho,ʼ ʻWhat,ʼ and ʻWhyʼ of Action
Foot’s critique of Nietzsche centers on her claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy is incapable of declar-
ing any act morally reprehensible in itself. She bases her argument in what she calls Nietzsche’s “per-
sonalism,” which, based upon her description, I take to be her reading of Nietzsche’s view more of-
ten called perspectivism.71 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to Foot’s reading of Nietzsche by her 
term, but use perspectivism when referring to my own position. According to Foot, personalism is 
an attempt to shift the focus of moral judgment from the ‘what’ of an action (the action in itself), to 
the ‘who’ of the action (the agent who acts). She claims that, “given the horrors of the past cen-
tury… today it would be especially strange not to see the ‘what’ of actions as even more 
important.”72  In Foot’s view, Nietzsche’s personalism is a move in the wrong direction, away from 
objective arguments for the unconditional rejection of extreme acts of injustice (such as genocide). 
In this section I argue that this is an oversimplified account of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Nietz-
sche’s ethics does not provide the basis for a categorical endorsement or rejection of any type of 
action because he is opposed to typologies of action which typify modern moral theory. However, 
Foot’s assertion that he replaces moral typologies of action with a typology of persons is an inaccu-
rate characterization of the moral ramifications of perspectivism. Foot’s claim, that Nietzsche wants 
to shift moral judgment from the ‘what’ to the ‘who’ of action, is still beholden to a traditional dual-
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ism between agent and action which Nietzsche rejects, and therefore misses the point of the con-
textualized viewpoint Nietzsche supports. I then go on to argue that, while Nietzsche does argue 
that the superior individual is not bound by universal proscriptions, this does not mean that the su-
perior individual will run rampant. Foot’s concern plays off the assumption that such proscriptions 
are necessary to prevent individuals from indulging in, and acting on, the more vicious side of hu-
man desire. In the case of the superior individual, at least, Nietzsche thinks that such proscriptions 
are unnecessary.
 Foot describes Nietzsche’s personalism as the claim that “right and wrong in action could 
not be determined by what was done except in so far as that stood in a certain relation to the particular nature 
of the person who performed it.”73 In Foot’s eyes, such a doctrine is problematic because of its universal 
scope. She is not arguing that the ‘who’ of an act is never relevant, only that there are instances 
where the ‘who’ ought not be relevant.74 In other words, there are acts that are so horrendous that we 
should not need to ask questions about the agent in order to see the act as morally reprehensible.
 For Foot, the problem with looking at the ‘who’ rather than the ‘what’ of an act is tied to 
what she sees as Nietzsche’s binary view of people. In Foot’s reading, “The important question to 
ask about any man was whether he represented an ascending or descending type. This was the pro-
found classification, and determined the worth for the particular instance of those elements of 
character and action that moralists wrongly thought significant in themselves.”75 Here, “ascending” 
identifies what I have been referring to as the Nietzschean superior individual: one who is strong, 
healthy, has depth, and seeks solitude.76 By contrast, the descending type means the weak masses—
what Nietzsche elsewhere refers to as the herd (as in BGE §199). In Foot’s view, this distinction is of 
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the utmost importance for Nietzsche because she thinks it is the deciding factor for him in questions 
of right action. Put simply, Foot thinks the ascending type acts beyond moral reproach, whereas the 
descending type does not. Foot’s worry is that, if the factor that determines the moral status of an 
action is only the type of person who performs it, there is nothing to stop murder from being mor-
ally justified when performed by an “ascending” individual.77  She thinks Nietzschean personalism 
leaves us in this quandary, which she sees as good enough reason to reject Nietzschean ethics.
 I agree that this sort of distinction between types is found throughout Nietzsche’s writings 
in various forms. However, Foot’s assertion that, for Nietzsche, this question of type is the distinc-
tion one must make when questioning the moral status of an action reveals a major flaw in her ex-
planation of personalism. In order to bear out the concern that an ascending person might be able 
to do terrible things, one needs to assume that the classification of a person is separate from their 
actions. That is to say, when an ascending person acts in the world, it does not matter what their ac-
tions are, only that they are done by an ascending person. This treats the type of person (the ‘who’) 
and their action (the ‘what’) as independent. Yet this presumption—that a person and their actions 
can be, and are, separate in the relevant sense—is part of the standard view of the self Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism intends to reject.
 A major motivation behind Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a rejection of the dualist metaphysi-
cal conception of the self.78 However, as it pertains to moral questions, one particular move is im-
portant to note: the Nietzschean ‘moral agent’ is always a person in the world. That is to say, they 
always have a past, they are always in a particular sociohistorical time and place, and they always are 
acting with particular goals in mind. In this context, Nietzsche’s argument that we must account for 
the ‘who’ of an act is not to value the ‘who’ instead of the ‘what.’ Such a valuation would fail to es-
cape the dualist metaphysics Nietzsche rejects. Instead, Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism claims that 
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which MacIntyre makes the focus of  Nietzsche’s rejection of  the Enlightenment moral project.
the ‘who’ and ‘what’ are inextricably linked, and therefore examining either in isolation is a mistake. 
Foot is correct that, according to Nietzsche, moralists wrongly take actions to be significant in them-
selves, but this does not mean that Nietzsche intends to substitute a typology of persons for a ty-
pology of  action.
 What arises from Nietzsche’s view that the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of action are conjoined is his 
placing a priority on a third question: the question of ‘why’ or ‘to what end?’ Nietzsche wants to 
look at why a particular agent would engage in a particular action. The end towards which a person 
aims forms a linkage between the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ which, for Nietzsche, is the means by which 
we can judge the value of both the ‘who’ and the ‘what.’79 Take the passage Foot uses to support her 
view as an example.80 In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche claims that the value of egoism in a person 
depends upon the value of the person who is egoistic. Foot focuses on one particular line: “Every 
individual may be scrutinized to see whether he represents the ascending or the descending line of 
life. Having made that decision, one has a canon for the worth of his self-interest”(T, Skirmishes 
§33). However, looking at the passage more broadly, it is clear that Foot’s extrapolation from this, 
that the type of person determines the value of egoism, is too literal. Nietzsche says that those who 
represent the ascending line of life are justified in their egoism. But how  do we determine whether 
one represents ascent or descent? By “scrutinizing” them, which is to say, looking at who they are as 
evidenced by what they do. In this passage, Nietzsche is primarily echoing the Aristotelean concep-
tion of proper pride, albeit with a provocative flair and bravado typical of Nietzsche. In other 
words, one represents ascent, in this instance, by being egoistic to the extent that he or she has 
something worth being egoistic about. This reading is supported by comparison with another 
prominent passage where Nietzsche talks about the more contemptible branch of self-interest, van-
ity (BGE §261). Whereas proper egoism, for Nietzsche, implies that the individual merits their own 
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79 Though I do not pursue it here, this triad of ‘who,’ what,’ and ‘why’ has obvious similarities with the tripartite system 
of  ethics laid out by MacIntyre (cf. Ch. 1 §2).
80 Foot, “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” 147-148.
high self-opinion, the vain do not think well of themselves and compensate for this by attempting to 
sway others to think well of  them instead.
 This contrast makes clear that the important issue for Nietzsche is not the ‘who’ or ‘what’ of 
an action, but the ‘why.’ Further, it is only in light of the answer to this ‘why’ that the ‘who’ and the 
‘what’ can be fleshed out. In the case of egoism, the ‘why’ is the distinction between the justified 
egoism of the superior individual and the manipulative attempt to raise oneself up which is the van-
ity of the slavish. In each of the two passages, it is action (what Foot would call the ‘what’) which—
through considering it in relation to its end (the ‘why’)—presents us the ability to make a character 
judgment (the ‘who’). It is worth noting that the judgments of character at issue here are in line with 
the normative dimensions of the will to power I outlined in section one of this chapter. For Nietz-
sche, virtuous action is virtuous insofar as it is an expression of human excellence, and this excel-
lence in action is distinctive because of the life-affirming motives which lay behind the action—the 
‘why’ or the ‘to what end’ of  that action.
 While Foot recognizes that Nietzsche wants to delve into the explanatory power of psycho-
logical motivation, her division of moral action into an either/or of action and agent does not es-
cape the agent/action dualism which Nietzsche rejects, and therefore necessarily mischaracterizes 
the central role motivation plays in Nietzsche’s ethics. Foot’s concern about Nietzsche’s “ascending 
types” is exaggerated by her reading of perspectivism. However, even with my more moderate ex-
planation of perspectivism, Foot would likely remain adamant that Nietzsche views a certain group 
of  elites as effectively (and troublingly) above moral reprimand.
 As I see it, the sticking point for Foot is her view that, when Nietzsche denies the categorical 
rejection of certain acts, he denies the only thing which keeps the vicious in check. And, if the vi-
cious happen to think themselves prime examples of the Nietzschean superior individual, things will 
quickly get ugly. It is important to note, however, that this view implies that human nature requires 
the constraints of morality in order to act rightly, for without it we would revert to something re-
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sembling a Hobbesian state of nature. If this implication bears out, then Foot’s concern is perhaps 
fitting. However, the implication that humanity needs the constraint of morality in order to act well is 
precisely the idea Nietzsche rejects in the case of  the superior individual.
 In Nietzsche’s mind, our assumption that we need to be contained is an artifact of slave mo-
rality. Slave morality is founded on ressentiment, but slave morality is also the only thing which keeps 
that ressentiment in check.81 While this is a standard interpretation of Nietzsche’s exposition of slave 
morality in the Genealogy, it has two implications which are important here. First, Nietzsche would 
likely agree with Foot that some people certainly need restraining. However, according to Nietzsche, 
it is not the strong, but the weak who, consumed by their ressentiment, would be disastrously destruc-
tive were they not kept in control (GM, III §14). Second, Nietzsche does not think that everyone 
needs the universal proscriptions of morality to refrain from terrible actions. For Nietzsche, it is the 
strong, the superior individuals, who are capable of being “beyond good and evil.” This does not 
mean that they are depraved or fundamentally unable to understand moral valuations. Instead, Ni-
etzsche is arguing that, for the superior individual, a moral theory is unnecessary, and insofar as mo-
rality is fashioned to constrain the viciousness of the weak, it likely inhibits the flourishing of the 
strong unnecessarily. It is this second point which is the focus of Nietzsche’s ethical project, and 
which I think, if  fleshed out, can rebut Foot’s concern about Nietzsche’s immoralism.
 In an important passage about his “denial of morality” Nietzsche makes clear that he is not 
suggesting that we should revert to a world in which anything goes. He writes,
“It goes without saying that I do not deny—unless I am a fool—that many actions called immoral 
ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged—but I 
think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto.”(D §103)
Here, Nietzsche makes clear that, while he does want to call morality into question, this does not 
entail an absolute suspension of constraint. He rejects that the reasons underlying our moral pro-
scriptions do not provide suitable justification for these proscriptions, but does not claim that those 
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81 Ressentiment—French for resentment—was adopted by Nietzsche as a technical term for the brooding and vicious bit-
terness which is the psychological motivation of  the weak.
actions are themselves unsuitable or problematic. In other words, Nietzsche is rejecting the supposi-
tion of Foot’s argument, that the constraints of modern morality are necessary to prevent the Nietz-
schean superior individual from running amok in society. It is worth noting that this passage pre-
dates Nietzsche’s distinction between noble and slave moralities, but captures a more important dis-
tinction. As Robert Solomon points out, the difference is between the Kantian notion of ‘morality’ 
and the Humean notion of ‘morals.’82 ‘Morality,’ according to this distinction, is the system of rules 
which attempt to justify right action, the system which Nietzsche “denies.” ‘Morals,’ on the other 
hand, are those actions “called moral” which Nietzsche says “ought to be done and encouraged.”83 
Although Foot takes Nietzsche’s denial of ‘morality’ so defined to entail a rejection of ‘morals’ as 
well, it is clear from Nietzsche’s claim in Daybreak, that he rejects only the former.84 His “immoral-
ism” is not encouraging the superior individual to act immorally—to pillage, rape, and murder. 
Rather, it is only encouragement to find reasons for our actions outside the model of contemporary 
‘morality.’
 The question of what these reasons are, then, becomes centrally important. Fleshing out 
these reasons has been the task of Nietzsche scholars such as Robert Solomon and Michael Slote. 
While Solomon and Slote approach Nietzsche from different vantage points, the picture of the su-
perior individual that each paints supports my claim that the rejection of ‘morality’ does not entail a 
rejection of ‘morals.’ For each thinker, the hallmark of the superior individual is the pursuit of excel-
lence conjoined with the discipline required to bring such pursuits to fruition. It is my contention 
that this conjunction is a distinctly modern one, combining the aretaic virtues of ancient nobility 
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different manner than Clark’s distinction between the terms, which I discuss in Chapter 1 §2.
83 This is, in essence, the same distinction which inspired Clark to re-title her translation of the Genealogy, as discussed in 
Ch. 1, §2.
84 Even then, Nietzsche may not necessarily reject all moralities. He certainly is critical of the generally Kantian or utili-
tarian moral dispositions of 19th century philosophers. However, his contention that slave morality is necessary for the 
sick and the weak leaves room for the possibility that some sort of morality is acceptable, so long as it does not apply to 
the superior individuals who are capable of  more.
with the self-discipline which Nietzsche sees as the primary innovation and achievement of slave 
morality. Recall that, in my discussion of Nietzsche’s naturalism, I argued that unlike Foot, Nietzsche 
saw epochal changes in culture as capable of reshaping what it means for humans to flourish. The 
conjunction of these aspects of slave and noble morality means that, in the case of the superior in-
dividual, they stand at a distance from a time where slavery and unmotivated raids were a regular 
part of  the political landscape.
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Solomon attempts to articulate the character of the 
superior individual as a modern Aristotelean project aimed at rejecting Kantian morality. Solomon’s 
depiction is centered around a passage in The Gay Science, where Nietzsche argues that we ought to 
“give style” to our character (GS §290).85 Style, in this discussion, is the term Nietzsche uses for the 
authenticity or self-becoming which is the pinnacle of Nietzschean virtue. However, as Nietzsche 
describes it, this style requires the discipline of “long practice and daily work,” and as such, it is only 
an avenue for the rare and exceptionally strong willed. Thus, for Solomon, the superior individual is 
characterized by the artistic pursuit of authenticity, which is only possible via the conjunction of as-
pects of  both slave and noble morality, combined in and transfigured by the superior individual.
 While Slote contends that Nietzsche actually presents a distinctly un-Aristotelean ethics, the 
qualities of the superior individual that Slote highlights are the same. Slote characterizes Nietzschean 
virtue ethics with the phrase “morality as inner strength.”86 This morality, as he sees it, has four main 
components: “courage to face facts,” “self-sufficient self-reliance,” “self-sufficient moderation and 
generosity,” and “strength of purpose.”87  Generally speaking, the first two of these four represent 
the commitment to excellence for which Nietzsche revered ancient nobility, while the latter two rep-
resent the ability to be hard with oneself which Nietzsche finds in the ascetic ideal, which figures 
prominently in Christianity. For Slote’s agent-based ethics, these four components are signs of the 
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inner strength, or strength of character, that we all find intuitively admirable. As such, it follows that 
anyone who does not exhibit these qualities when appropriate has a deficient strength of character. 
The central emphasis of Slote’s “agent-basing” is the idea that a properly virtuous character naturally 
exhibits all these characteristics simultaneously by virtue of their inner strength. Therefore, despite 
his divergence from Solomon’s reading of Nietzsche, Slote’s image of the superior individual also 
fits my assertion that the superior individual’s ethical project is founded on the conjunction of as-
pects of  both slave and noble morality in modern culture.
 Thus, whatever one may argue about the “reasons other than hitherto,” which Nietzsche men-
tions in Daybreak, they are reasons which entail avoiding and resisting actions called immoral without 
reference to categorical proscriptions. In the case of Solomon, the superior individual is almost sin-
gularly focused on the authentic pursuit of excellence seen as living artfully. If this characterization 
of the superior individual has a political flaw, it is not lust for power, but political apathy. For Slote, 
the types of concerns Foot raises are out of the question because they are seen as acts of weakness 
and desperation by virtue of the ressentiment which provides their motivation. While each reading has 
its advantages and problems, both provide convincing evidence that the superior individual is not a 
tyrannical threat to society at large.
 Finally, I want to question Foot’s assertion that the genocides of the twentieth century pro-
vide good reason to reject Nietzsche and renew our search for the grounds of universal proscrip-
tions against certain types of action. Foot herself mentions that, despite the force of his challenge, 
Nietzsche has not really shaken our belief in the general commitments of traditional morality.88 As 
she notes, moral theory has continued on rather unfazed. Given this fact, it is safe to say that the 
universal proscriptions Foot claims are necessary were as firmly sedimented for Hitler’s Germany as 
they were for Nietzsche’s Germany or Kant’s Germany. Still, those proscriptions did little to prevent 
the genocidal campaign of Nazism which Foot mentions as a supporting example against Nietz-
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sche’s rejection of universal proscriptions.89  The same could be said for the other dictators Foot 
cites. If these horrific episodes in human history are an occasion to reconsider the value of our val-
ues, I should think them to be a point in Nietzsche’s favor. We had—and more or less still have—a 
firm cultural sense that murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing are categorically wrong, yet the episodes 
Foot mentions have happened despite this categorical rejection. Nietzsche asserts the real danger to 
humanity is not the superior individual, but those whose bitterness and hatred toward themselves 
and others is held in check only by the thin constraints of morality (GM, III §14). However, unlike 
Foot, Nietzsche’s solution is not to try to thicken and reenforce the foundations of a morality he 
thinks is failing, but to support the potential of the exceptional in hopes that they might realize the 
possibility of  new excellences in modern times.
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Conclusion:
Nietzscheʼs Place in Virtue Ethics
The two chapters which comprise this thesis have each sought to respond to major critiques of the 
Nietzschean superior individual’s relation to his or her society. While MacIntyre and Foot offer dif-
fering criticisms of Nietzsche’s ethics, their concerns are topically similar in that they are both con-
cerned with the relationship between the superior individual and society more broadly. I have argued 
that Nietzsche has a reply to each critique, yet their focus highlights an important question for any 
theory of Nietzschean virtue ethics. How should we approach the relationship between the Nietz-
schean superior individual and his or her society? Admittedly, the responses presented here do not 
comprise a complete answer to this question. However, in my responses to MacIntyre and Foot, I 
hope to have cleared the ground for a more positive account of the Nietzschean superior individual 
vis a vis his or her society. This thesis does not aim to fully flesh out an account of this relationship, 
yet my rebuttals of Foot and MacIntyre raise two particular points which any such account would 
necessarily incorporate. I would like to conclude by briefly discussing these points.
 First, MacIntyre’s and Foot’s takes on Nietzsche are similar in that both view the superior 
individual as significantly separated from society. For Foot, this separation is the ground of her con-
cern insofar as she sees the superior individual as not only rejecting morality (understood as a system 
or moral code), but normative practice altogether. This places the superior individual fully outside 
the expectations of their culture, and in her eyes, makes the superior individual dangerous. For Mac-
Intyre, the separation of the superior individual from society is not the basis for problems with the 
superior individual. Instead, it is the problem itself. As MacIntyre sees it, the normative force of an 
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ethics is tied to its socially grounded history and tradition, and in attempting to create new values, 
the superior individual prevents such a grounding.
 In each case, I have argued that these criticisms are misguided insofar as it is a mistake to 
view the superior individual as fundamentally separate from their society. Instead, I claim that the 
superior individual is ‘of ’ their society in the same sense that any individual is. They are not distinct 
by virtue of stepping outside of their society, but by virtue of their ability to gain a critical distance 
from it in order to make something else of it (and of themselves). This critical distance does sepa-
rate the superior individual from the “herd,” but it does not cut the superior individual off from 
public life in a robust sense. In addition to the reasons for rejecting MacIntyre’s and Foot’s readings 
given in the preceding chapters, there is also a general reason we should not expect Nietzsche’s supe-
rior individual to be radically cut off from society: Nietzsche’s thoroughgoing rejection of Kantian 
morality. It is the Kantian tradition which seeks to get outside of the particulars of a social place and 
time in order to establish universal moral laws. Nietzsche’s rejection of this method is largely a claim 
that one cannot get outside of one’s time and place. This effectively precludes the disconnected view 
of  the superior individual which lies behind both MacIntyre’s and Foot’s critiques.
 Second, Nietzsche’s thought is primarily diagnostic, which is to say that he spent most of his 
energy on criticism, and very little on an affirmative project. Nietzsche talks of his ideal types almost 
exclusively as people who have yet to come, individuals whose way he is preparing, by pointing out 
the flaws in society around him. In this sense, Nietzsche is not presenting an instantiation of the 
superior individual (either in life or writing), but providing what he hopes will be the catalyst which 
brings about the superior individual. For this reason, I think that concerns about a Nietzschean ethi-
cal program are generally misconceived insofar as they take Nietzsche’s affirmative ethics to be a 
clearly defined ethical project. While authors have outlined various Nietzschean conceptions of eth-
ics, there is no fully articulated theory to be had. Nietzsche’s ethics tends to focus on character and 
omit discussions of right action. A complete ethical theory requires at least some treatment of both 
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topics, and in this sense, Nietzsche’s ethics is incomplete. As a result, although I think Nietzsche has 
much to contribute to modern ethics, any robust solutions to problems such as pluralism or social 
justice will necessarily need to not only overcome his critiques, but also go beyond his vision of the 
“free spirit” in order to develop a complete conception of  the superior individual.
 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche distinguishes between genuine philosophers and philo-
sophical laborers (BGE §211). The difference, he says, is that the philosophical laborers’ task is “to 
make everything that has happened and been esteemed so far easy to look over, easy to think over, 
intelligible and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even ‘time,’ and to overcome the entire past” 
whereas genuine philosophers “create values.” While one might expect Nietzsche to put himself in the 
latter category, I think the fact that he consistently places the ideal human in the future implies oth-
erwise. He was, in a sense, the last philosophical laborer of the Enlightenment and his work focuses 
heavily on overcoming the entire past (although Nietzsche often paints a less humble self-portrait.) 
According to Nietzsche, philosophical laborers are not unimportant, but they are only important 
insofar as they are the condition of  possibility for the next generation of  genuine philosophers.
 It is in this light that I think Nietzsche’s ethics in general, and the social aspects of his ethics 
in particular, must be approached. Nietzsche does not present an ethics as Aristotle does, and he did 
not set out to. While some of the content of his social outlook is remarkably dated and his social 
outlook is challenging in general, this does not cripple his philosophy—despite accusations to the 
contrary. Most of all, any critique of Nietzsche regarding the values of the superior individual must 
bear in mind that Nietzsche did not lay out a clear plan for those values. He certainly outlines some 
virtues. However, we have little reason to think Nietzsche’s virtue theory includes any discrete ethical 
program, and it should not be taken as such. Nietzsche’s hope was that, partly due to his efforts, 
some of us might become the superior individuals he saw on the horizon, and if we do, that we 
would create our own values.
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